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the Ethical Basis of Bureaucratic Action: 
~ :rnocracy, Rationalization, and Communicative Competence 
STEVEN D. E ALY 
Armstrong State College 
In this paper I analyze and evaluate three models of administrative ac-
. n· Weber's rationalized bureaucracy, Long's democratic bureaucracy, 
tJO · 
nd Habermas' s interactive bureaucracy . All three of these approaches 
alaim to pro vide a normative foundation for bureaucratic activity. Of the 
~hree, however, only Habermas's model, based on the theory of com-
municative competence, actually provides an adequate ethica.l framework 
for bureau cratic action. 
Rationalization and Bureaucratic Action 
Based on a reading of Max Weber's analysis of bureaucracy, one might 
conclude that "bureaucratic ethics" is a self-contradictory concept. in his 
famous distinction between the official and the politician, Weber maintains 
that the official , unlike the politician, engages in impartial administration. 
The official' s sole responsibility is to be the executor of the will of the 
superior authority. 
The honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute con-
scientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order 
agreed with his own conviction. This holds even if the order appears 
wrong to him and if, despite the civil servant's remonstrances, the 
authority insists on the order. Without this moral discipline and self-
denial, in the highest sense, the whole apparatus would fall to pieces. 
This exhau sts the moral obligation of the official: to do as he is told. 1 
The official , unlike the politician, has no personal responsibility for what is 
done. 
For Weber, bureaucracy itself is an attempt to rationalize governmen-
tal activity in accordance with the distinction between politics and ad-
ministration. The politician is concerned with values, with setting the goals 
of government. The bureaucrat is concerned with administering the pro-
grams set up to achieve the goals selected by the politician. The activity of 
the bureaucrat , then, is legitimately judged in terms of economy and effi-
ciency rather than in terms of the rightness or wrongness of actions taken. 
This view is not merely of historical interest, however, for there are 
those who hold variations of Weber's position today. This is the general 
view, for example, for Victor Thompson . According to Thompson, the 
modern public organization is "a machine-like instrument or tool. It is an 
artificial system of prescribed roles and rules." 2 The organization does not 
care, nor does it feel. It acts "without sympathy or enthusiasm" to carry 
out efficiently the "externally defined goal" set by its owner. 
If this understanding is correct, then the proper response to the ques-
tion "Who acts in bureaucratic action?" is that no one acts. It is not a who 
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that acts , but a what-an organization, an agency, a bureau, or an offic 
Thompson, of course, recognizes that there are individuals in organi~: 
tions. In fact, individuals may even be a key element in organizati ons f 
"human institutions are shaped by the kind of human material availabie ;; 
them. " 3 
The fact that persons people organizations creates a problem fo 
Thompson, for these persons may attempt to act in ways which are not con~ 
ducive to, or which are even contrary to, the goal of the organizati on as set 
by the organization's owner. Control, therefore, becomes the guiding Prin. 
ciple for an organization's structure and operation. 
To ensure that the owner's goals are achieved, the indivi duals who 
work in the bureaucracy (the "human material") must be "neutr alized," or 
at least their personal goals and desires must be neutralized, so that they can 
efficiently and rationally carry out their orders. These neutr alized in-
dividuals become "functionaries" who do their duty, apply their skills, and 
perform their practical routine, regardless of what or whose goal is involved.• 
The purpose of this neutralizing of the individuals who work for the 
bureaucracy is to ensure that when they act, they act as a part of the 
organization . The organization, which Thompson has already indicated 
cannot feel or care, cannot type either. A functionary is therefore needed to 
do the typ ·ng. The same is true for making phone calls, for reviewing ap. 
plications, ·or sorting applications into categories, and for saying yes or no 
in the case of each request. All of these activities are carried on by func-
tionaries. These functionaries are the organization in action. 
If this view is correct, then "bureaucratic ethics" is a simple matter in-
volving mere obedience to orders. There are, however, at least two dif-
ficulties with this view. First, this view presents an unrealistic picture of the 
way organizations actually function. Second, this view is an unacceptable 
guide to the way in which organizations should function, for it leads to ir-
responsible action. 
It is now widely accepted that the politics/administration dichotomy 
introduced by Weber is not as clear-cut as he may have thought.' Observa-
tion of the operations of bureaucracy in the United States tends to support 
Norton Long's claim that "the bureaucracy is in policy, and major policy, 
to stay . " 6 This is true, not only for career civil servants who have worked 
their way to the top of the bureaucratic structure, but for agency employees 
at all levels. This is not simply because of a desire on the part of civil ser• 
vants to usurp the legitimate authority of political leaders. On a day-to-day 
basis, administrative decisions routinely involve considerations which re-
quire an interpretation and application of policy. These "ends " issues can-
not be separated from the "means" issues left to bureaucrats in the rational 
model. ' 
Paralleling the claim that organizations do not and cannot function on 
the basis of a division between politics and administration is the claim that 
organizations should not attempt to function on the basis of such a divorce. 
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fhe separation of politics from administration will lead to irresponsible ac-
. n and will foster the fiction that " the system" alone is responsible for 
tl~a~ happens . For Weber, "the honor of the political leader .... lies 
w eciselY in an exclusive personal responsibility for what he does, a respon-
pi~ilitY he cannot and must not reject or transfer."' Weber is here con-
:rasting the politician with the official, who has no personal responsibility 
for what he does. 
This understanding allows for the evaporation of responsibility in at 
least two ways . First, it leads to what Orion White has called "apparent ac-
tion," action taken by institutions.9 This appearance of "institutional ac-
tion" is made possible by the specialization and compartmentalization of 
modern organizations. The functionary who gives an order is not the in-
dividual who carries out the order, and thus there is a separation of will 
from action . The functionary who executes the order does so without think-
ing (or in spite of thinking), and thus there is a separation of action from 
reason. This distance separating the functionary from the action he has 
ordered makes it appear that the organization is acting, rather than the 
functionary. Institutions or organizations cannot act, any more than they 
can type. Only the individuals who make up the organization can act. The 
functionary, not the organization, acts. Neither functionary, however, is 
responsible for the action taken according to this view. Externally, it ap-
pears tha t "the system," rather than the "human material," is responsible. 
But this, in fact, means that responsibility cannot be placed anywhere . 
Second, this view inhibits those within the organization from 
understanding that they (rather than "the organization") are acting. The 
fiction that the acts of the functionary are in reality the acts of the organiza-
tion separates the actor from understanding his own action as his action. 
This can be seen in the claim that one is not responsible because he was "only 
following orders ." Even in simply "following the rules," however the of-
ficial is acting . The functionary sees his own action as the organization's ac-
tion. By filling a role in the organization, he is not himself doing anything, 
the organizational role is. In his "role" as a human being, with opinions 
concerning jutice and injustice, he maintains his freedom to choose between 
right and wrong. But these two roles do not mix . At home in the evening, 
the human being may disapprove of what the functionary was called upon 
to do at work, but he is certainly not responsible for what the functionary 
may have done. 10 
In addition to the problem of responsibility, the use of rationalization 
as a guide to action provides no standard for conduct in individual cases in 
which the bureaucrat is required to deal with an individual. While "univer-
sal" standards require that all likes be treated alike, no guidance in terms of 
treatment is provided. While the rational mode of calculation may be able 
to tell one the most efficient way to route mail or build a bridge, it does not 
provide guidance for the way to deal with other people. It is this very in-
ability which Thompson seeks to cover by speaking of "roles" rather than 
individuals. 
151 
Democracy and Bureaucratic Action 
The "rational" understanding of bureaucratic action has been attacked 
by those who see the bureaucracy as inextricably entangled in the making of 
"value decisions" (policy making). Since the separation of politics and ad. 
ministration is a fiction, it is no longer possible to accept purp osive ra. 
tionality as the basis for bureaucratic action. In the "democratic" view of 
bureaucratic activity, attention shifts from control of function aries to con. 
cern for "the people," the "owners" of the organization. The democratic 
critics of rational administration agree with Thompson that "the people" is 
the owner, but they disagree over how the will of the owner is to be determined. 
The standard answer to the question of the will of the people (and the 
answer given by many "rationalists") is that the will of the people is ern. 
bodied in the laws of the land . That is, the legislature represents the will of 
the people, and the bureaucracy should simply execute the law. If the law is 
unclear, then the bureaucracy should follow the lead of the legislature. ,, 
Norton Long argues that this matter is not quite so simple, however. In 
a system with a two-house legislature, which house is to be tr eated as 
authoritative in identifying the will of the people? To further complicate 
matters, the executive is also elected, is ultimately responsible for the activity 
of the bureaucracy, and can claim to represent the will of the people. In 
such circumstances, who actually does represent the will of the people? ' 2 
The answer given by the "democrats" is that the bureaucracy looks to 
neither legislature nor executive, but settles for itself what the Jaw means 
and how it shall be carried out. This is the case not only at the " policy-
making" level of the bureaucracy, but also lower in the organiz ational 
structure, because policy as set by administrative order is not necessarily 
any more comprehensive or understandable than that enacted in law. 
Long's solution to the problem of bureaucratic action is " represen-
tative bureaucracy." By respresentative bureaucracy Long mea ns that the 
makeup of the bureaucracy reflects the makeup of the nation at large . Long 
argues that there are key elements of society which are "unre pre sented, 
underrepresented, or malrepresented in Congress," but which are 
represented adequately in the bureaucracy. ' 3 In fact, according to Long, 
if one rejects the view that election is the sine qua non of representa-
tion, the bureaucracy now has a very real claim to be conside red much 
more representative of the American people in its compositi on than the 
Congress. This is not merely the case with respect to the class structure 
of the country but, equally significantly, with respect to the learned 
groups, skills, economic interests, races, nationalities, and religions. 
The rich diversity that makes up the United States is better repre sented 
in its civil service than anywhere else. 1• 
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Assuming for a moment that there is a "class interest" based on sex, 
ce religion, age, and education, does a demographically representative 
~a r;aucracy ensure that these interests will be represented? Subramaniam 
~gues that bureaucrats drawn from these particular types of groups tend to 
~eviate from the norms of those groups. 15 But even if there is an identifiable 
lass interest, and even if the members of these groups remain faithful to 
class norms, how do the democrats want these norms to affect the activity 
:f these "representative bureaucrats?'" 6 
Long does not answer this question directly, but approaches it obliquely 
through what he calls the "ethical constitution of bureaucracy." 17 Long un-
fortunately treats this issue by stating merely that the bureaucracy is at least 
a concerned with constitutional government as in the Congress. Paul Van 
Riper, however, formalizes this aspect of the problem in his definition of 
representative bureaucracy. According to Van Riper, a representative 
bureaucracy is one which has a reasonable cross section of members from 
the various groups of society, and which is in general tune with the ethos 
and attitudes of society." It is this second requirement which is essential if 
representative bureaucracy is to represent the will of the people. 
Does this notion of representative bureaucracy provide a standard 
from which to judge and on which to base bureaucratic action? Does 
representative bureaucracy provide for responsible action? The answer to 
both of these questions is no. 
The notion of representative bureaucracy changes the "rational" ques-
tion of "what does the politician want me to do?" to "what do 'the people' 
want me to do?" In making this transition, the question becomes almost 
impossible to answer. The will of one man, at least, can be determined with 
ome confidence. Determining "the will of the people" is very difficult in-
deed, and for the same reasons which Long himself has enumerated. 
Perhaps Long wants to maintain that it is somehow easier for bureaucrats 
to identify or embody the will of the people than it is for legislators. The 
danger of this approach, especially if these representative bureaucrats are 
motivated by their class interest, is that they will tend to identify a select 
group as "the people.'" 9 This notion provides no guidance in determining 
the proper choices in individual cases. 
An even greater difficulty than this, however, is found in the irrespon-
~ible nature of bureaucratic action under such a scheme. "The people" 
replaces "the politician," but the divorce of will from action, and action 
from reason, will be at least as great under representative bureaucracy as 
under rational bureaucracy. Further, the blindness of the actor will be at 
least as great also. Instead of confusing oneself with the "organization," 
the bureaucrat will confuse his action with the action of "the people." 
The democratic model of bureaucratic action thus faces the same prob-
lems faced by the rational model. 2° First, there is no way to translate "the 
will of the people" into guidance for individual actions. Second, the respon-
ibility of the actor (the bureaucrat) is obscured by the fiction that it is the 
people, rather than the individual, who is acting. 
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Communicative Competence and Bureaucratic Action 
In this section I present the theory of communicative com petence as 
alternative understanding of bureaucracy which does provi de an ethi: 
foundation for bureaucratic action. When Victor Thompson speaks of th 
organization as a system of rules and roles, he reifies what is actually a P t~ 
tern of interaction between individuals (or groups of individua ls). In soda 
ing, he abstracts the most important element from conside rat ion: peopt' 
Organizations are people, acting in more or less stable ways over a period if 
time. The major problem with both the rational and the democratic ap. 
proaches to bureaucratic action is the assumption both make that th 
organization is established by an external force, which sets the agenda fo; 
the organization. As a result of this assumption, and the atte ndant distinc. 
tion between owner and organization, the separation of will and reason 
from action occurs. 
Rather than speaking of rules and roles in the abstract, it is more ac-
curate to say, as does Herbert Storing, that "the civil servant is full of pro-
cedures, rules, and regulations. " 21 This places the acting individual at the 
core of bureaucratic activity. We can go even farther than th is, however. 
The rules, regulations, and procedures which the bureaucrat is full of, arc 
not simply imposed on him by a higher authority, but are developed 
through the mutual action, interaction, and reaction, of superi ors, subor-
dinates, and extra-organizational third parties who are invo lved with the 
organization . The bureaucrat doing his job is not simply dro pped into an 
artificial system which is already established, but he himself helps to create 
and recreate the system as he engages in activity. The rules, regula tions, and 
norms which are codified in writings on bureaucracy are snaps hots which 
show as immobile what in reality is in motion. 
Speech Acts and Bureaucratic Actions 
The use of the theory of communicative competence to analyze and 
evaluate bureaucratic action is not simply arbitrary, but grows out of the 
nature of bureaucratic activity . When we examine bureaucratic action, what 
we are examining in most cases is communicative action: the establishment 
and interpretation of rules, the issuance of directives, the rejec tion or ap-
proval of various types of requests. What the bureaucrat spends his time do-
ing is communicating, either through speaking or writing . 
A distinction borrowed from linguistic analysis will help to clarify the 
nature of bureaucratic action. The elementary unit of speech is the speech 
act, "the smallest (verbal) utterance which is comprehensible and accept-
able to at least one other competent actor within a communication 
context. " 22 This speech act, according to Jurgen Haberman, has a double 
structure, which may be seen by dividing the speech act into its two 
components. 21 
The dominant component of the speech act, the performativ e compo-
nent , provides the pragmatic context of speech through the establis hment of 
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. ersonal relationships. 2• These relationships form the basis for inter-
inte~P tivity and allow for mutual understanding. This development of in-
ubJec f' 1 1 f . . b 'ectivity is the irst eve o commumcat1on. 
ters\te dependent component of the speech act is the proposition, which 
'des the content of speech. The proposition establishes the connection 
p~o~~ speech act with the world of events and objects. This disclosure of the 
0 t Id (objectivity) is the second level of communication. n 
wor h . h h . . k h A successful speec act requires t at t e part1c1pant spea er- earers 
municate on both levels simultaneously and that the double structure of 
co:ch be fulfilled. This means that, in the speech act, both the objective 
P rid (of propositions) and the intersubjective world (of mutual subjective 
WO • d . I I 26 
nderstanding) are pos1te s1mu taneous y. 
u The main features of this analysis of the speech act can be applied to 
the analysis of bureaucratic action. The elementary unit of bureaucratic ac-
tivity is "the bureaucratic act," which has a double structure. The objective 
component of the bureaucratic act is "the decision," which is comparable 
10 the proposition of the speech act. The decisional component of the 
bureaucratic act is the output of bureaucratic activity, the "yes" or "no" in 
response to a particular request. 
The second component of the bureaucratic act is its performative 
dimension, which provides the pragmatic context for action. This compo-
nent of the bureaucratic act establishes the internal context of action 
through the relationships between co-workers, between supervisors and 
subordinates, and between unit heads and employees. This component also 
establishes the external context of action through relationships between the 
staffs of different agencies, between political agents and staff, and between 
clients or adversaries (the public) and the office staff. 
It is this distinction which allows one to speak of the ethical basis of 
bureaucratic action without becoming totally entangled in the policy dimen-
ion of bureaucratic activity. The performative component of action can be 
evaluated apart from the policy or decision component of that action . 
This distinction also allows for the solution of the problem that moti-
ated Thompson's attack on sympathy and enthusiasm. For Thompson, 
"sympathy" (any non-rationalized consideration affecting organizational 
operations) necessarily leads to "stealing" from the organization's 
owners. 21 It is possible, however, to reconcile "sympathy" (the recognition 
of the intersubjective dimensions of organizational activity) with the public 
good if the distinction between performance and decision is maintained. 
While there is undoubtedly a connection between the propositional and the 
performative components of bureaucratic action, the treatment of clients in 
"human" rather than "rationalized" terms does not mean that the 
bureaucrat will simply give in to the illegitimate demands of potential 
clients. 
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The Validity Claims of Speech and Bureau<;ratic Ethics 
With the parallel between the speech act and burea ucratic acti 
established, I turn to the ethical foundation of speech and its relationship on 
bureaucratic ethics. Every speech act raises simultaneously four validi~o 
claims: truth, legitimacy, sincerity, and comprehensibility. In normal coi:. 
munication these four claims stand as the tacit background consensus fo 
ongoing communicative action, but any or all of these claims may ~ 
challenged and thus become the object of investigation. 21 
The claim to comprehensibility is settled by the very act of corn. 
municating. According to Habermas, clarity is a prerequisite for all corn. 
munication, and its claim is satisfied so long as communicatio n is actually 
taking place . If clarity is lacking, then the utterances of one or both parties 
are unintelligible, and communication will stop until a langu age of mutual 
understanding is found . 
The claim to sincerity can be satisfied only through interac tion over a 
period of time. Satisfaction of this claim is based on the coinc idence of the 
speaker's actual behavior with the intentions he has impute d to himself . 
While the first two validity claims may be settled empirically, the 
claims to truth and to legitimacy can be settled only throug h free and open 
discussion, or discourse. In discourse the only force which may influence a 
decision or agreement is the force of the better argument. To ensure that no 
other force interferes in the free development of consensus, discourse posits 
the equality and freedom of all speakers to participate in the ongoing 
discussion. 29 While these conditions may not actually be fulfille d in any real 
setting, every communication "anticipates" these conditi ons (which are 
identified by Habermas as the "ideal speech situation"). 30 
The nature of language then provides us with the standar d by which to 
judge its use. But beyond a standard for the explicit use of language, the 
nature of language also provides us with a standard from which to judge all 
human action, which ultimately is communicative action. 31 
The natural standards of speech therefore provide the ethical founda-
tion for bureaucratic action. Bureaucratic action may be ju dged in terms of 
its truth, its clarity, its sincererity, and its legitimacy . To be more specific 
and accurate, the action of bureaucrats may be judged in these terms . To 
adhere to the distinction made earlier, truth and legitimacy are the validity 
claims which underlie the "propositional component" of bur eaucratic ac-
tivity (the policy, the decision), while clarity and sincerity underlie the 
establishment of the intersubjective context of bureaucratic activity (the 
"performative component" of bureaucratic action) . 
Just as truth and legitimacy are discursively determined, so the pro-
positional component is judged in terms of the "critica l interaction" 
underlying its acceptance and implementation. 32 Such critic al interaction 
approximates the ideal speech situation by allowing political an d technical 
personnel to discuss the policy issues involved in bureaucratic action in a 
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.......---
tting in which all concerns-technical, scientists and component of 
se reaucratic action, the performative component, ties the actor directly to ~~ action. In this scheme the bureaucrat is responsible both for the action 
·tself and for the contest of the action . 
1 
The performative component of bureaucratic action is judged by the 
tual degree of clarity and openness on the part of the bureaucrat, just as 
ataritY and sincerity claims are settled empirically. My argument is that 
~hese notions can provide us with a critical standard from which to judge 
day-to-day routines of bureaucratic activity. These standards can also pro-
vide us with a critique of our own actions as we operate within a 
bureaucratic framework. In dealing with intra-organizational associates, 
clarity and sincerity will allow the organization to know what it itself is do-
ing. In dealing with extra-organizational parties, clarity, and openness will 
allow for the critical interaction of these parties in organizational activities. 
I conclude with two observations. First, the distinction between policy 
and day-to-day activity is artificial. The standards of day-to -day activity 
will impinge on policy questions, as will policy standards (truth and 
legitimacy) impinge on day-to-day activities. The approximation of clarity 
and sincerity may well entail certain policy consequences, and thus provides 
an exmple of the "anticipation" of the ideal speech situation. 
Second, Habermas claims that if clarity is not achieved, communica-
tion breaks down. 34 In the case of bureaucratic activity, however, com-
munication continues and even accelerates in the face of incomprehensibility. 
While one may not find communication is such situations, one does find 
' 'psuedo-communication. " 35 This may be either accidental or intentional, 
for incomprehensibility may be used as a weapon either in internal struggles 
or against outside parties. Incomprehensibility, in fact, is an especially ef-
fective weapon if it is tied to the tools of political violence, such as the en-
forcement powers accorded to an agency. When instrumental action, and 
thus control, becomes the guiding principle of bureaucratic organization, 
we should perhaps expect this to be the case, for confusion facilitates control. 36 
It very well may be that the apparently insurmountable lack of clarity 
found in bureaucratic pronouncements, regulations, and guidelines, and the 
obvious lack of interest or concern on the part of bureaucrats before the 
public eye, are at the heart of the intuitive understanding that' 'bureaucratic 
ethics" are non-existent. If this is the case, then we can see the primary im-
portance of the performative aspect of bureaucratic action. Regardless of 
the policy orientation of the bureaucracy, until it is perceived to be 
operating in a clear and truthful (sincere) manner, it will be perceived to be 
operating in an ethical vacuum. Until the bureaucrat speaks and acts clearly 
and sincerely, he is acting unethically. 
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"Thompson, pp. 10-11. 
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Theory, pp . 306-310, Bernstein, pp. 208- 213, and Ealy, pp. 142-145. 
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